deny.toml

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# cargo-deny configuration — supply-chain policy.
#
# Runs in CI (.github/workflows/ci.yml) on every push/PR and weekly
# cron. Sits ALONGSIDE cargo-audit (.cargo/audit.toml): audit covers
# CVE advisories; deny additionally enforces license whitelist,
# duplicate-major-version banning, and source-registry locking.
#
# Every `ignore`, `skip`, or `exception` below MUST include:
#   - The crate + version it pertains to
#   - The dependency path that pulls it in
#   - The reason we accept it (no upstream fix / out of code path / …)
#   - The planned remediation
#
# An entry that lacks a documented remediation is debt, not policy.

[graph]
# Examine every target. Don't restrict; e.g. `r-efi` (LGPL-2.1-or-
# later) only links under UEFI targets but appears in Cargo.lock for
# all-target deps; we want the license check to fire regardless of
# host so the exception below is intentional, not a happy accident
# of OS-specific resolution.
all-features = true
no-default-features = false

[output]
feature-depth = 1

# ─── Advisories ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#
# Mirrors `.cargo/audit.toml` so the two tools never diverge. When
# adding/removing an ignore here, mirror it there (and vice versa).

[advisories]
db-path = "~/.cargo/advisory-db"
db-urls = ["https://github.com/RustSec/advisory-db"]
# Hard-fail on yanked. The `ignore` list is the only escape; each
# entry must justify itself.
yanked = "deny"
ignore = [
    # rsa 0.10.0-rc.18 — Marvin Attack timing sidechannel (CVSS 5.9 medium).
    # Path (Cargo.lock, `cargo tree -i rsa`, 2026-10-21): russh 0.64.1
    # → rsa 0.10.0-rc.18, directly and through ssh-key 0.7.0-rc.11.
    # The advisory lists no patched version (rsa 0.9.10 and
    # 0.10.0-rc.18 are both affected as of its 2026-09-14 update), so
    # no russh bump can close it.
    # Why accepted: the Marvin Attack requires a network attacker
    # who can issue many adaptive RSA decryption queries against a
    # long-lived key under timing observation — not the proxxx
    # threat model (we use SSH for one-shot console handoff against
    # trusted Proxmox nodes, not as a network crypto service).
    # Remediation: blocked on the upstream `rsa` crate landing a
    # constant-time decryption path. Track:
    # https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/issues/19
    "RUSTSEC-2023-0071",
]

# ─── Licenses ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#
# Whitelist permissive + public-domain. Block GPL / AGPL / SSPL
# outright. MPL-2.0 is allowed because it's weak file-level copyleft
# and does NOT force the linking application's license (used for
# nucleo fuzzy-search and option-ext).

[licenses]
confidence-threshold = 0.8
allow = [
    # Permissive (the bulk of the Rust ecosystem):
    "MIT",
    "MIT-0",
    "Apache-2.0",
    "Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception",
    "BSD-1-Clause",
    "BSD-2-Clause",
    "BSD-3-Clause",
    "ISC",
    "Zlib",
    "Unicode-3.0",
    # Public-domain dedications:
    "0BSD",
    "CC0-1.0",
    "Unlicense",
    # Corporate-permissive:
    "BSL-1.0",             # Boost Software License (ryu)
    "CDLA-Permissive-2.0", # Community Data License (webpki-roots)
    # Weak file-level copyleft (linking under permissive is OK):
    "MPL-2.0",             # nucleo / option-ext
]

exceptions = [
    # r-efi 5.3.0 / 6.0.0 — LGPL-2.1-or-later. UEFI runtime bindings
    # pulled transitively through the wasi target families. Not
    # actually linked into our Linux / macOS / Windows artefacts
    # (only x86_64-unknown-uefi and aarch64-unknown-uefi resolve
    # it), but appears in Cargo.lock so cargo-deny scans it
    # regardless of target. LGPL accepted as a one-crate exception
    # rather than broadening the allow list to copyleft globally.
    # Remediation: nothing to do — r-efi is the canonical UEFI
    # bindings crate; if the wasi ecosystem ever switches to a
    # permissive rewrite, drop the exception.
    { crate = "r-efi", allow = ["LGPL-2.1-or-later"] },
]

[licenses.private]
ignore = false

# ─── Bans ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#
# `multiple-versions` is "warn" not "deny": the Rust ecosystem
# regularly has 2–3 major versions of foundational crates (rand,
# hashbrown, getrandom) in flight via transitive deps and forcing
# unification would mean pinning ancient deps everywhere. The signal
# we want here is "a NEW dup appeared in a PR" so reviewers can ask
# the proposer to consolidate — `warn` shows up in CI output as a
# soft alert without blocking.
#
# Explicit denies below are crates we never want at any version:
# native-tls / openssl families (we use rustls end-to-end on every
# transport — REST, PBS, WebSocket, SSH).

[bans]
multiple-versions = "warn"
wildcards = "deny"          # no `version = "*"` in Cargo.toml
highlight = "all"
workspace-default-features = "allow"
external-default-features = "allow"

deny = [
    # rustls-only TLS posture — block all native-tls / openssl paths
    # so a transitive bump can't quietly re-introduce libssl.
    { crate = "openssl", reason = "rustls-only TLS posture; native-tls path is intentionally absent" },
    { crate = "openssl-sys", reason = "rustls-only TLS posture; native-tls path is intentionally absent" },
    { crate = "native-tls", reason = "rustls-only TLS posture; reqwest / russh / PBS all on rustls" },
]

skip = []
skip-tree = []

# ─── Sources ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#
# Lock crate sources to crates.io. No git deps allowed — every crate
# must come from the official registry so cargo-audit and the SBOM
# can verify provenance. The `internal-russh-forked-ssh-key` crate
# IS a fork BUT it's published to crates.io as a regular package
# under that name, so it passes this check naturally.

[sources]
unknown-registry = "deny"
unknown-git = "deny"
allow-registry = ["https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"]
allow-git = []