deny.toml

Rama master · réplica de lectura del repositorio original.

# SPDX-License-Identifier: FSL-1.1-Apache-2.0
#
# cargo-deny policy, shared by both Cargo workspaces (`cli/` and `operator/`
# are separate workspaces with no top-level Cargo.toml, so `scripts/cargo-deny.sh`
# runs cargo-deny once per workspace against THIS file).
#
# ## Why this file exists
#
# Until 2026-09 there was no advisory tooling here at all. The version watcher
# (`scripts/upstream-versions.py`) asks "are we behind the newest release?",
# which cannot see the two states that actually hurt:
#
#   * a crate that is ABANDONED sits on its own final release forever, so it is
#     never "behind" — `oci-distribution` reported as perfectly current for
#     eighteen months while the project had been renamed to `oci-client`;
#   * a crate with an unfixable advisory is not behind either.
#
# So the report made a dead dependency look healthier than a maintained one
# that ships often. This file asks the other two questions: is it alive, and is
# it known-vulnerable.
#
# ## The rule for `ignore`
#
# Every entry below is a REVIEWED decision with its reasoning inline, and the
# value is exactly that: without this file the same advisories were simply
# silent. An ignore with no `reason` is not acceptable here — if it cannot be
# justified in a sentence, it should not be ignored.
#
# When an ignored entry names a work item that clears it, delete the entry in
# the same change that closes the item. `unmaintained` is set to `all` rather
# than `workspace` on purpose: three of the four unmaintained crates below are
# transitive, and transitive is where this class hides.

[advisories]
version = 2
# `all` includes transitive dependencies. The narrower `workspace` setting
# would have reported NONE of the four unmaintained crates found on
# 2026-09-22 (rustls-pemfile, backoff, derivative, instant), because every one
# of them arrived through kube 0.95. The kube 4.2 bump (WI-357) cleared all four
# and their ignore entries went with it.
unmaintained = "all"
yanked = "deny"

ignore = [
    { id = "RUSTSEC-2023-0071", reason = """
The Marvin timing side-channel in the `rsa` crate. NOT REACHABLE HERE, and
no published version fixes it — 0.9.10 is the newest stable and the 0.10 RC
line does not address it either (RustCrypto/RSA#626 is still open, and the
advisory's own `patched` list is empty).

Marvin attacks PRIVATE-KEY decryption. This repo performs none in production.
The only production `RsaPrivateKey` is cli/cli-providers/src/cert.rs:67, which
calls `to_public_key()` and compares it against the certificate's key — no
decrypt, no sign. Every `.decrypt()` in the tree is inside a `#[cfg(test)]`
module. The production RSA operation is `RsaPublicKey::encrypt(Oaep)` in
cli/backup-core/src/sealing.rs, which is public-key only.

The algorithm is not ours to change: RSA-OAEP is in the type signature of
sealed-secrets' own `Unseal(codecs, privKeys map[string]*rsa.PrivateKey)`, and
the SealedSecret object carries no algorithm identifier or format version.

RE-EXAMINE THIS if a private-key decrypt or sign ever enters a production path.
That is the condition that makes this ignore wrong, not a version bump.
""" },
]

[bans]
# Duplicate versions are reported, not fatal. They are usually somebody else's
# pin rather than a defect of ours — e.g. sha2 0.10 arriving through
# async-nats -> nkeys -> ed25519-dalek while our own direct dependencies are on
# 0.11, or rand 0.9 through kube-client's tungstenite beside the held rand 0.8
# in cli/backup-core. Worth seeing; not worth blocking on.
multiple-versions = "warn"
wildcards = "deny"
# The workspace's own crates depend on each other by `path`, which cargo-deny
# counts as a wildcard. That is the normal shape of a multi-crate workspace,
# not a dependency we failed to pin — the check is here for wildcards on
# THIRD-PARTY crates, which is where an unpinned range is a real hazard.
allow-wildcard-paths = true

[licenses]
# Deliberately NOT a policy yet. A license allow-list is its own decision with
# its own review, and asserting one here as a side effect of adding advisory
# scanning would be the wrong way to make it. `version = 2` means unlisted
# licenses are denied, so this list is the current, observed set rather than an
# endorsement — extend it consciously.
version = 2
# Our own crates declare `license = "FSL-1.1-Apache-2.0"` (CLAUDE.md, ADR 0032),
# which is a real licence but not an SPDX identifier, so cargo-deny reads them
# as unlicensed. They are workspace members and are not published to crates.io,
# so the licence question this section exists to answer — "what are we
# redistributing?" — does not apply to them. SPDX conformance of our OWN
# headers is `scripts/check-spdx-headers.sh`'s job, and it already runs.
private = { ignore = true }
allow = [
    "Apache-2.0",
    "Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception",
    "BSD-2-Clause",
    "BSD-3-Clause",
    "BSL-1.0",
    "CC0-1.0",
    # Community Data License Agreement, Permissive 2.0 — the licence on
    # `webpki-roots`, which is Mozilla's root-certificate bundle. It is a DATA
    # licence rather than a code one, which is why it does not appear on the
    # usual permissive-code list; permissive in the same sense.
    "CDLA-Permissive-2.0",
    "ISC",
    "MIT",
    "MIT-0",
    "MPL-2.0",
    "OpenSSL",
    "Unicode-3.0",
    "Unlicense",
    "Zlib",
]

[sources]
unknown-registry = "deny"
unknown-git = "deny"